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RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
LOUISVILLE, NEW ALBANY & CHICAGO RAILWAY CO. v. BUCK.
If a brakeman, engaged in common labor on Sunday, in pursuance of a general
contract with a railroad company, is injured by the negligence of the company, he
may recover damages for such injury.
In an action by an administrator, for causing the death of his decedent and to
recover damages by reason thereof, for the widow and children of the deceased, a
general averment that such widow and children have sustained damages is sufficient.

If a brakeman is ignorant of a defect in a car coupling, which defect is not
obvious and cannot be seen, except by stooping down and looking for it, he is not
guilty of contributory negligence in going between cars to couple them.
Declarations of the brakeman made immediately after the injury, while being
taken from under the car wheels, are admissible in evidence as a part of the res
gestae.

If a special verdict is silent concerning any of the issues in the case, it will be
assumed that the party having the burden of proof on them, failed to prove them.
A venire de novo will not be granted where a special verdict does not contain

an affirmative or express finding upon some of the issues in the case.
APPEAL

from Benton Circuit Court.

Buck, as administrator of the estate of George H. Bennett,
deceased, commenced suit against the Louisville, New Albany
& Chicago Railway Company, alleging that the company had
wrongfully caused the death of the decedent, to the damage of
his surviving widow and child. , The complaint was in three
paragraphs. It is charged in the first two paragraphs, that
the intestate was in the employ of the railway company as
brakeman, and that he was fatally injured while uncoupling
cars, on account of dangerous and defective appliances and
machinery which the company negligently supplied. The
same facts, substantially, were stated in the third paragraph,
with the addition that the accident and fatal injury to the
plaintiff's intestate were caused by the careless and negligent
habits, and by the incompetency, of the engineer who had
control of the engine at the time the accident happened, and
that the incompetency and negligent habits were known to the
company and unknown to the intestate. No question was made
as to the sufficiency of the complaint, except it was urged that
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it did not sufficiently appear, by any averment therein, that
the widow or child of the decedent sustained damage in anywise, on account of the defendant's negligence.
The jury returned a special verdict, which, so far as they are
material to the questions for decision, exhibited the following
facts: The deceased, a man about thirty years of age, in good
health, and of industrious habits, was in the employment of
the defendant railway company as brakeman on a freight train.
On Sunday night, November 25, 1883, the train of which he
was one of the crew left Michigan City for La Fayette. Between 9 and io o'clock the train was stopped at the crossing
of the Pan Handle Railroad, for the purpose of taking on more
cars. It was part of the duty of the decedent to couple and
uncouple cars which were to be attached to or detached from
the train. Soon after the train stopped he went in between
the engine and the car attached to it, for the purpose of
uncoupling the car from the engine. The car was loaded with
lumber, and belonged to the defendant company, but the
decedent had never seen it until after it was loaded, when starting from Michigan City. The reach-rod which, when properly
adjusted, held the brake-beam in place, was, and had been for
several days, absent from the break-beam, in front of the wheels
on the car next to the engine. The absence of this rod was
unknown to the decedent, but the jury found that it was or
might have been known to the defendant. Its absence caused
the beam to hang lower and more forward than it otherwise
would have done; but the fact that the rod was gone, was not
discoverable, except by one stooping down and looking under
the car. While attempting to uncouple the car, being for
some reason unable to get the coupling-pin out of the drawbar, the decedent held the pin up as far as he could get it, and
then signaled the engineer to move the engine forward. The
engineer obeyed the signal, but immediately, and without
warning, reversed the lever, and threw the engine back, crowding the decedent against the car, and then again moved forward.
While so crowded back, and before he could recover or extricate himself from his position, the decedent's feet were caught
by the defectively attached brake-beam, and he was thrown
under and run over by the car, which was moving forward.
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In this way, he received injuries which were particularly described, and which resulted in his death, the following morning.
It was found that the decedent left a widow and child, as
alleged in the complaint, and that they were damaged by his
death in a specified sum. There was judgment for the plaintiff
accordingly.
George W. Friedley, George W Earley, and George R. Bidridge, for appellant.
E.. P. Hammond, William B. Austin and Coffroil & Stuart,
for appellee.
MITCHELL, J., January io, 1889 (after stating the facts, as
above). The averments in the complaint, relevant to the point
thus made, are, that Bennett was in the employment of the
defendant as brakeman at the time of his death, and that he
left surviving him, as his next of kin and only heirs, his widow,
Fidella J. Bennett, And his daughter, Longretta May Bennett,
both of whom are still living,-the latter being four years of
age. It is also averred that "said administrator brings this
action for the use and benefit of said widow and child, who, by.
reason of the death of said decedent, as aforesaid, have sus-.
tained damages in the sum of $io,ooo."
For the appellant it is insisted that the general averment
that the widow and child of the decedent had sustained damages in a specified sum was not sufficient, but that the pecuniary
loss, either present or prospective, resulting to them from the
intestate's death should have been specially pleaded. Regan
v. Railway Co. (1881), 51 Wis. 599, is relied on to sustain the
view thus contended for.
Without pointing out the distinction between the case cited
and that under examination, in respect to the question involved,
it is sufficient to say it appears in the complaint in the present
case, that the decedent was, at the time of his death, in the
employ of the railroad company as a brakeman, and that he
left a widow and one child four years old. It was an unavoidable inference, therefore, that he was in the vigor of manhood,
and that he was at the time engaged in earning money for the
support of his wife and child: Kelley v. Railway Co. (i88o),
50 Wis. 381. Section 284, Rev. St. 1881, gives a right of
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action to the personal representative, for the benefit of the
widow and children or next of kin of one whose death has
been caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, provided the former could have maintained an action against the
latter had he lived. While there is some discord in the decisions of courts in respect to the right to maintain the action,
even for nominal damages, without averring and proving actual
pecuniary loss by those for whose benefit the suit is brought,
there can be no doubt but that, within the rule generally prevailing, the law will imply substantial pecuniary loss in some
amount to the wife and child, from the death of one who sustained the relation of husband and father to them, and who was
at the time presumably receiving wages, and who was therefore possessed of the ability to discharge his obligation to
support those dependent upon him: Railroad Co. v. Wcber
(1885), 33 Kan. 543; fHoughkirk v. President(1883), 92 N. Y.
219; I Shearm. & Red. Neg. (4 th Ed.), § 137.
Whatever the rule may require as applied to other cases, and
in respect to the quantum or character of proof on the subject
of pecuniary loss, there can be no doubt but that a general
averment of damages in a case like the present is sufficient as
against a demurrer to the complaint. It may be well to observe
here, as applicable to this question, which is presented in
another aspect later on in the record, that no precise rule for
estimating the loss recoverable under the statute can be laid
down. When the relation of the party whose death has been
caused, to those for whose benefit the suit is being prosecuted,
has been shown, and his obligation, disposition, and ability to
earn wages or conduct business, and to care for, support, advise
and protect those dependent upon him, the matter is then
to be submitted to the judgment and sense of justice of the
jury: Commissioners v. Lcgg (1883), 93 Ind. 523; Tilley v.
Railroad Co. (1864), 29 N. Y. 252 ; Castello v. Landwwelr (187 1),
28 Wis. 522.
The appellant insists that the judgment ought to be reversed,
and urges as one of the reasons that the jury found that the
injury which resulted in the intestate's death was received on
Sunday, while he was engaged at common labor in pursuance
of a contract with the railway company, and that it was not
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made to appear that the work about which he was engaged
was a work of necessity. We had occasion to consider the
question in Railway Co. v. Frawley (1886), I io Ind. 18, where
it was presented in substantially the same manner as in the
present case. Our conclusion there was, that a person injured
by the negligent omission of another to perform a legal duty,
would not be denied a recovery, even though it appeared that
the injured person was, at the time of receiving the injury, acting in disobedience of his collateral obligation to the State,
which required of him the observance of the Sunday law. If
the railway company violated its duty by furnishing machinery
and appliances which it knew were defective, the danger to an
employe, who was required to use the appliances, in ignorance
of their defective condition, was the same on one day as on
another. That they were being used on Sunday rather than
on Monday, neither contributed to, nor was it the efficient
cause of, the injury which gave rise to this action, nor can the
railroad company now interfere and become the champion of
the Sunday law as an excuse for its wrong, or to defeat a
recovery: Sutton v. Wauwatosa (1871), 29 Wis. 21. It is
quite true that a plaintiff will, in no case, be permitted to recover, when it is necessary for him to prove his own illegal
act or contract as a part of his cause of action, or when an
essential element of his cause of action is his own violation of
law: Holt v. Green (1873), 73 Pa. 198; Hall v. Coppell(i868),
7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 558; Stecle v. Burkhardt (1870), 104 Mass. 59;
J-fcGrath v. Merwin (1873), 1I2 Id. 467. But where he can
prove his cause of action, without proving that he was violating
the law, even though it appears incidentally that he was, at the
time, acting in disobedience of some statute, unless his illegal
act was the efficient or proximate cause of the injury complained of,or unless the illegal act or contract is the foundation
of his action, a recovery may be sustained nevertheless: Cooley
on Torts (2d Ed.), 178, 179.
Wh6ever travels about from place to place for the purpose
of gaming with cards or otherwise, acts in violation of a criminal statute. It would hardly be claimed that a recovery
against a common carrier would be denied, if it appeared incidentally in evidence, that a passenger, injured through the
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carrier's negligence, was traveling in violation of the statute
against gaming. Why should a brakeman, who is required to
work in violation of the Sunday law, be denied a recovery?
The gist of the action in the present case is the negligent failure
of the railway company to furnish safe and suitable appliances,
whereby the death of the plaintiff's intestate was wrongfully
caused while he was in the company's service as a brakeman.
The contract of employment and the time when the injury
occurred, were mere incidents to, and were in no respect the
foundation of, the action: Rail-way Co. v. Frawley, supra;
Frost v. Plumb (1874), 13 .AMERICANLAW REGISTER, 537.
It may be conceded that the decisions in some of the States
are not all consistent with the conclusions above stated; but,
in our opinion, these conclusions are in accord with the better
view of the subject, and have the support of the weight of
authority.
The defendant presented to the court forty-three separate
instructions, and asked that they be given the jury. Of these,
twenty were given and the balance refused. The refusal to
give these instructions is made the ground of complaint. It
has frequently been ruled that where the jury has been required
to return a special verdict, general instructions as to the law
of the case are not proper. The court should explain to the
jury distinctly what facts are material to be found within the
issues, and give them such instructions as will enable them to
find and settle the facts, so that the law may be applied to the
facts found by the court: Railway Co. v. Frawley, supra;
Razlway Co. v. Flanagan(1887), 113 Ind. 488. Within this
rule, an examination of the instructions given by the court
leaves no doubt but that the jury were adequately directed in
respect to the facts necessary to be covered by the special finding. Leaving out of view all of the facts found relating to the
alleged negligence and incompetency of the engineer, and
eliminating from the special verdict everything in the nature
of conclusions of law, and it seems to us the facts found make
a case juztifying a recovery. They show that the railroad
company failed in its obligation to supply its employe with
safe and suitable appliances and machinery to do the work
required of him, and that it required him to use machinery
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which it knew to be defective. This established the company's
negligence. The special verdict also shows that the defect in
the machinery was unknown to the decedent; that it was not
obvious, and could not have been discovered, except by stooping down and looking under the car. This showed that the
employe was not guilty of contributory negligence in going
in between the cars to uncouple them, notwithstanding the
defective condition of the appliances. It is settled beyond
controversy that railroad employes are presumed to understand the nature and hazards of the employment when they
engage in the service, and that they assume all the ordinary
risks and obvious perils incident thereto. Such risks are presumably within the employe's contract of service: FJectriz
Light Co. v. Aurphy, Supreme Court of Indiana, September
29, I888.
This does not mean, however, that the latter may not repose
confidence in the prudence and caution of the employer, and
rest on the presumption that he has also discharged his duty
by supplying machinery free from latent defects which expose
the employe to extraordinary and hidden perils: Car Co. v.
Parker(I884), IOO Ind. I8i ; Hoeglt v. Railway C. (1879), IOO
U. S. 213. While the employer may expect that an employe
will be vigilant to observe, and that he will be on the alert to
avoid, all known and obvious perils, even though they may
arise from defective tools and machinery (Engine Works v.
Randall (1884), IOO Ind. 293), yet the latter is not bound to
search for defects, or inspect the appliances furnished him to
see whether or not there are latent imperfections in or about
them which render their use more hazardous. These are
duties of the master, and .unless the defects are such as to be
obvious to any one giving attention to the duties of the occasion, the employe has a right to assume that the employer has
performed his duty in respect to the implements and machinery
furnished: Bradbiny v. Goodwin (i886), loS Ind. 286; Railway Co. v. Leverett (1886), 48 Ark. 333; Railroad Co. v. Gildersleve (1876), 33 Mich. 133 ; Hhecs v. Railroad Co. (I88o),
27 Minn. 137; Wood on Master & Servant § 376.
The facts found very clearly furnish a basis for the application of the foregoing principles, and these principles, when

LOUISVILLE, N. ALBANY & CHICAGO R'Y CO. V. BUCK.

155

applied to the facts found, sustain the judgment of the court
upon the special verdict. Many of the instructions asked
would, if they had been given, necessarily have required the
jury to return very much of the evidence as part of their special
verdict, while others would have required the statement of
mere conclusions which the jury could not properly draw.
For example, in one of the instructions the court was asked to
require the jury to find what was the proximate cause of the
death of Bennett. In another, the court was asked to require
the jury to describe in their verdict the appliances attached to
the car for the purpose of breaking it. The facts showing the
manner in which the accident and injury occurred, and the
condition of the car and the appliances attached having been
particularly found and set out in the special verdict, it became
a question for the court to determine whether or not the intestate's death was proximately caused by the negligent omission
of duty on the part of the railroad company. We are unable
to perceive how the court would have been aided in arriving
at a correct conclusion, if the jury had been required to describe the appliances in their verdict. The material facts in
that connection were that there inhered in the appliances a
hidden or latent defect, which increased the ordinary and obvious perils of the service in which the intestate was engaged,
and which made them an efficient agency in producing the
fatal injury.
We have examined the other instructions asked and refused,
and, without commenting upon them in detail, we need only
say the court committed no error in refusing them.
It is contended that the court erred in overruling a motion
made by the appellant for a venire de novo. In this we do not
concur. It must now be accepted as settled that a special
verdict will not be considered as so uncertain, ambiguous, or
defective, as that no judgment can be rendered thereon, because
some of the issues in the case are not affirmatively or expressly
settled or determined thereon one way or the other. If the
verdict is silent concerning any of the facts in issue, the court
will assume, upon a motion such as that under consideration,
that the party upon whom rested the burden of proof in respect
to those facts failed to prove them. If the failure to find the
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facts was contrary to the evidence, it may furnish a sufficient
reason for a new trial; but the failure does not render the
special verdict objectionable, nor does it afford any ground for
a venire de novo: Glantz v. City of South Bend(1885), io6
Ind. 305; Dceter v. Sellers (1885), 102 Id. 458; Mitchell v.
Colglazier(i886), io6 Id. 464.
It may be conceded that there are some merely evidentiary
facts found in the special verdict, and that it also embraces
many statements which are essentially conclusions of law.
Notwithstanding all this, it seems clear to us that, stripped of
all these, the verdict is yet sufficient to lead up to and support
the judgment, and that the motion cannot be successfully urged
on that account.
Questions are made and discussed concerning the propriety
of rulings of the court, in admitting evidence, tending to show
that the engineer who had the engine in charge at the time
the decedent was injured, was negligent and incompetent.
According to our view of the case, there was no reversible
error in any of these rulings, for the reason that the special
verdict sustains the judgment, even though all the facts pertaining to the competency or conduct of the engineer be
eliminated from the case. While we have discovered no error
in the rulings, we do not regard them of sufficient materiality
to justify us in prolonging the opinion, by setting them out
separately, and examining them in detail.
The only other question which requires consideration relates
to the ruling of the court in admitting in evidence certain declarations of the decedent which were made immediately after
he was injured, and, substantially, while lie was being extricated from under the wheels of the car which had passed over
him. The conductor of the train testified that he was on the
caboose when he received notice that the decedent was hurt,
and that he immediately ran forward and found him under the
rear end of the second car from the engine. The following is
the testimony of the conductor upon which the objection is
predicated: "When I took him out I asked him, 'How did
this happen?' He told me that he was uncoupling the engine
from the first car, but could not get the pin clear out of the
draw-bar, and had to hold it up, and hallooed to the engineer
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to go ahead. He started, and by some cause 'threw the engine
over' and came back against him before he could get out, and
crowded him back against the car, and the brake-beam, catching his leg, pulled him down, and the cars ran over him." It
is not always easy to determine when declarations, having
relation to an act or transaction, should be received as part of
the res gestae, and much difficulty has been experienced in the
effort to formulate general rules applicable to the subject.
This much may, however, be safely said, that declarations
which are the natural emanations or outgrowths of the act or
occurrence in litigation, although not precisely concurrent in
point of time, if they were yet voluntarily and spontaneously
made, so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of
the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were
made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the
idea of design or deliberation, must, upon the clearest principles of justice, be admissible as part of the act or transaction
itself: Railway Co. v. Goddard(1865), 25 Ind. 185; Lund v.
Inhabitants(1851), 9 Cush. (Mass.) 36; Com. v. J1cPike (1849),
3 Id. 181; Factoryv. Barnes (1884), 72 Ga. 217; Insurance Co.
v. Mosley (1869), 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 397; People v. Simpson
(1882), 48 Mich. 474; Keyser v. Railway Co. Supreme Court
of Michigan, June 23, 1887; Kirby v. Corn. (1883), 77 Va. 681;
City v. Barbour(1884), 62 Tex. 172; State v. Horan (1884), 32
Minn. 394; Railway Co. v. Leverett, supra; State v. Alk Lois
(1869), 5 Nev. 99; RailroadCo. v. Coyle(1867), 55 Pa. 396-402 ;
Durkee v. Railroad Co. (1886), 69 Cal. 533; Lambert v. People
(1874), 29 Mich. 71; Hill's Case (1845), 2 Grat. (Va.) 594;
Jordan's Case (1874), 25 Id. 943; Harrimanv. Stowe (1874),
57 Mo. 93; Entwhistle v. Feihner(I875),6o Id. 214; Elkins
v. McKean (1875), 79 Pa. 501 ; Hart v. Powell (1855), 18 Ga.
635; Driscollv.People (1882),47 Mich.4I 3 ; Casey v. Railroad
Co. (1879), 78 N. Y. 518; McLeod v. Ginther (1882), 8o Ky.
399; I Whart. Ev. §§ 258-267. Any other rule would, in
many instances, operate to defeat the accomplishment of justice, by excluding evidence of the most trustworthy character.
While some of the cases cited above carry the doctrine to its
extremest length, they all illustrate and apply the general
principles consistent with the conclusions we have heretofore
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enunciated. The declarations under consideration were made
-within not to exceed two minutes of the occurrence while the
declarant remained in the presence of the train, and the alleged
defective machinery which was instrumental in producing his
hurt, and before he had been removed from the spot where he
received his fatal injury. The surrounding circumstances, in
the presence of which the declarations were uttered, were
therefore silent witnesses in corroboration of his statement.
This, taken in connection with the condition of the decedent,
who was suffering under the shock of an injury from which he
died in about six hours afterwards, necessarily excludes the
idea of calculation or ability to manufacture evidence for future
purposes. The court committed no error in admitting the
evidence.
There are a number of incidental questions of minor importance presented and discussed by counsel, but, so far as they
are material to the case as we have felt constrained to consider
it, they have all been disposed of by what has preceded.
Without entering upon a detailed examination of the evidence which tends to support the verdict, we content ourselves
with saying that, while some of the criticisms of counsel seem
plausible, and carry with them much force, we are nevertheless
constrained to hold, since there was some evidence which the
court and jury, whose duty it was to judge of its weight and
credibility, accepted as sufficient, that the judgment cannot
now be disturbed.
The judgment is therefore affirmed, with costs.
Injury while Travelling. There is

a line of cases, which hold, that, if an
injury is sustained by a traveller on
Sunday, by rea-on of any defect in the
highway, or, while travelling upon a
railroad or I'oat, by reason of the negligence of the carriers, no recovery can
be had.
The earliest case in Massachusetts
upon the question under discussion, is
Bosworth v. Swansey (1845), I0 Met.
363, where the town was held not liable, upon the ground that the unlawful
act of the plaintiff contributed to the

accident; and unless he could show
himself to be within one of the exceptions, he could not recover. This case
has been followed by numerous decisions, that such an offender contributes
to his own injury, and also, that, being
himself in the commission of a crime at
the time of receiving the injury complained of, he cannot recover: Lyons
v. Desolell (1878), 124 Mass- 387;
Davis v. Somerville (188o), 128 Id.
594; White v. Lang (188o), 128 Id.
598. It is always a good defence that
the travelling is unlawful: Jones v.
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Andover (1865), 1o Allen 1S. In this
case, it was held to be no excuse in a
servant, to travel on Sunday to supply
fresh meat for marketmen whom his
master had agreed to supply therewith,
although he could not do this, in additiol, to his other work, on Monday
morning, by reason of the extra work
entailed on him by his maoter's sickness. This doctrine was carried to an
extreme in Cox v. Cook (i867), 14
Allen 165, where it was held, that where
one travelling on Sunday, stopped at a
hotel, leaving his horse, wagon and
buffalo robe in the charge of the landlord's servant, and remained over night,
and on Monday morning the robe could
not be found, the landlord was not
liable for its loss; on the ground that
the travelling was illegal. Where one
was sailing for pleasure, in his yacht, on
Sunday, and was negligently run over
by a steamboat, it was held that he
could not recover the damages caused
thereby, unless the collision was caused
by the wantonness and malice of those
in charge of the steamboat: I Vallace
v. Alerrimack River Arav., etc., Co.
(1883), 134 Mass. 95.
[The exceptional cases are where the
act of travelling came within the allowance of the statute, as a work of necessity or charity. Such was oele v. L.
& B. R. R. C'O.(1875), i8 Mass. 195,
where a person was on his way to see
if a sick friend needed assistance. This
case was affirmed in Cronan v. Boston
(1884), 136 Id. 384, where an invalid
sister was visited. Barkerv. Worcester
(1885), 139 Id. 74, (affirming Hamilton
v. Boston (1867), I4 Allen 475), was a
case where a walk for exercise was
taken. So, Gorman v. Lowell (1875),
I17 Id. 65, where a mother was proceeding to purchase medicine for a sick
child.
The Massachusetts Laws provide
(Pub. Stat. 188z, ch. 98)3. Whoever
travels on the Lord's day, except from

necessity or charity, slall be punished
by fine, not exceeding ten dollars for
each offence. But the provisions of
this section shall not constitute a defence to an action against a common
carrier of passengers for a tort or injury
suffered by a person so travelling.
Which was afterwards restricted, by
Stat. of 1884, c. 37, I, so as not to
"constitute a defence to an action for a
tort or injury suffered by a person on
that day."]
In Vermont, it was held that a town
was not liable for an injury sustained
by a defect in the highway, by one who
was unlawfully travelling: Johnson v.
Town of
(1874), 47 Vt. 28;
0arl'uryh
S. C.,
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547, and note. The statute forbade
travelling on Sunday. The case was
one of first impression in that State, and
was considered at length; and althoegh
the same conclusion was arrived at as
in Maine and Massachusetts, the decision was put upon a different ground.
The ground of the decision was, not
that the plaintiff's illegal act of travelling contributed to the happening of the
accident, and for that reason deprived
him of the right of recovery, nor the
fact that he was engaged in an unlawful
act at the time he received the injury;
but that the town was under no obligation to furnish him a safe highway for
illegal travelling, so that he might safely
violate the law. Speaking of the first
two grounds assigned by some coinas as
a bar to a recovery, the Court said: "It
is difficult to maintain that the traveller's illegal act in such cases contributed
to the happening of the accident. The
insufficiency of the highway remaining
the same, and the traveller being at the
place of the insufficiency under the
same circumstances on any other day of
the week, the same accident and injury
would have befallen him. A contributory cause is one which, under the same
circumstances, would always be an ele-
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ment aiding in the production of the
accident. The fact that the traveller is
unlawfully at the place of the accident,
does not contribute to the overturn of
his carriage or to the production of the
accident. * * * * Neither, as I think,
can the fact that the party receiving the
injury was, at the time of the injury,
engaged in an unlawful act, deprive
him of the right of recovery. If the
plaintiff, at the time of the injury, had
been profaning the name of the Deity,
he would hive been engaged in an unlawful act; but no one would hold that
such an act would bar him from recovering of the town, if it were otherwise
liable, for the injury sustained. The
town could not relieve itself from the
consequence of its own wrong or neglect, by alleging the illegal act of the
plaintiff. Punishments are provided for
all unlawful acts, but their administration is not committed to the discretion
of towns; neither has a town the right
to add to the prescribed penalty, the
injuries resulting from its own wrongful
act or neglect." * * ** "Wnile I am
quite ready to yield my assent to the
reasoning of the learned judge who delivered the opinion in the case last
cited," Sutton v. Wauwatosa (871),
29 Wis. 21, "1 am not so well satisfied
that the opinion meets the real point
raised for decision. As heretofore remarked, the question is not, is the plaintiff barred from recovering for injuries
through the insufficiency of a highway,
and which he would otherwise be entitled to recover, because he was, at the
time he received the injuries, engaged
in an unlawful act, but, was the town
under a legal liability to furnish him a
safe highway to travel on, at a time
when he was by law forbidden to travel
on it? * * * * All persons were forbidden to use them on the Sabbath,
except for certain purposes. The statute
limiting their use, furnishes the measure
of the duty and liability imposed. In

other words, the duty and liability imposed are co-extensive with the purposes
for which persons can legitimately use
the highways, and no greater. A statute
which should forbid the use of highways for certain purposes, or on certain
days, or in a certain manner, would
limit the duty and liability of towns in
* **
regard thereto."
[So, in Holcomb et ux. v. Danby
(879), 51 Vt. 428, PIERPOINT, C. J.,
said: "It has been repeatedly held in
this State, that if a party sustain an injury, by reason of an insufficiency in the
highway, while such party is travelling
in violation of the statute, he cannot
recover of the town for such injury.
The facts in this case not only fail to
show a necessity for the plaintiff's travelling on the Sabbath, but show affirmatively that there was no such necessity
existing." Hence, where a parent was
injured on the Sabbath by a defect in
the highway, he was allowed to recover
on proof of his travel being to visit his
children; this was not unlawful, as the
children were properly away from
home: MlcClary v. Lowell, (1871),44
Vt. 116.]
[In Maine, the statute is substantially
the same as in Massachusetts. and in
O'Connell v. Lewis/on (1876), 65 Me.
34, the court held that a young lady,
who, on the Lord's day, walks with her
cousin three-fourths of a mile, simply
for excercise in the open air, did not
travel in violation of the statute, and
could recover for an injury suffered
through a defect in the highway. The
court say (VIRGIN, J.,delivering the
opinion): "Can a person recover for
an injury received through a defect in a
way, while travelling in violation of the
Lord's day statute ?" This question has
been repeatedly decided in the negative
in this and several other States, while
other courts of acknowledged learning
and ability have arrived at the opposite
conclusion. * * * * Before the separa-

LOUISVILLE, N. ALBANY & CHICAGO R'Y CO. 71. BUCK.

tion, the laws of Massachusct:s were
our laws. * * * This decision has the
authority of the court in Massachusetts,
after a complete review and thorough
analysis of the statutes: Hamilton v.
Boston (1867), 14 Allen 475." This
decision was followed in Davidson v.
Portland (1879), 69 Me. 116, where
the plaintiff was injured during a walk
for recreation only. It is the fact of
travelling, and not the manner, which
is prohibited: Cratty v. City of Bangor
(1870), 57 Me. 423. And no distinction is made between travelling in town
and from town to town: [illock v. Wehb
(1868), 56 Me. ioo.]
Reeovery for injury sustained on
highway. But there are cases that hold
an opposite view. Thus, where the
plaintiff was driving his cattle to market
on Sunday, in violation of a statute, and
they were injured by the breaking down
of a defective bridge, which the defendant town was bound to maintain, it
was held that his illegal action did not
prevent a recovery, upon proof of the
defendant's negligence in the construction and maintaining of such bridge:
Sutton v. Town of Tauwatosa, supra.
The Court said: "The cases may
be summed up and the result stated,
generally, to be the affirmance of two
very just and plain principles of law,
as applicable to civil actions of this
nature, namely: first, that one party to
the action, when called upon to answer
for the consequences of his own wrongfulact done to the other, cannot allege
or reply the separate or distinct wrongful
act of the other, done not to himself nor
to his injury, and not necessarily connected with, or leading to, or causing or
producing the wrongful act complained
of; and, secondly, that the fault, want
of due care, or negligence on the part
of the plaintiff, which precludes a recovery for the injury complained of, as
contributory to it, must be some act or
conduct of the plaintiff having the relaVOL. XXXVII.t I
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tion to that injury, of a cause to the
effect produced by it.
* Under
U
the operation of the first principle, the
defendant cannot exonerate himself or
claim immunity from the consequence
of his own tortious act, voluntarily or
negligently done to the injury of the
plaintiff, on the ground that the plaintiff
has been guilty of some other and independent wrong or violation of law.
Wrongs or offences cannot be set o.Y
against each other in this way." Id. 26.
"But we should work a confusion of
relations, and lend a very doubtful
assistance to morality," say the Court
in _l~ohnej, v. Cook (IS55), 26 Pa. 342.
"if we should allow one offender
against the law to the injury of another,
to set off against the plaintiff that he too
is a public offender. Himself guilty of
a wrong, not dependent on, nor caused
by that charged against the plaintiff, but
arising from his own voluntary act, or
his neglect, the defendant cannot assume the championship of public rights,
nor to prosecute the plaintiff as an
offender against the laws of the State,
and thus to impose upon him a penalty
many times greater than what those
laws prescribe."
"And as to the other principle, that
the act or conduct of the plaintiff, which
can be imputed to him as a fault, want
of due care or negligence on his part
contributing to the injury, must have
some connection with the injury, as
cause to effect, this also seems too
clear to require thought or elaboration.
"All other conditions and circumstances remaining the same, the same accident or injury would have happened on
any other day as well. The same
natural causes would have produced
the same result on any other day, and
the time of the accident or injury, or
that it was on Sunday, is wholly immaterial so far as the cause of it or the
question of contributory negligence ii
concerned. In that respect, it would
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be wholly immaterial that the traveller
was within the exception of the statute,
and travelling on an errand of necessity
or charity, and so was lawfully upon
the highway": Sutton v. WVauwatosa,
supra. To same effect is Alexander v.
Oshkosh (1873), 33 Wis. 277; AlArthur v. Green ilay and Alississi:pi
Canal Co. (1874), 34 Id. 139, (a boat
unlawfully passing through a canal
lock); Piatz v. Cohoes (I88i), 24 Hun

Court also point out the fact that the
action is not against a town for an injury caused by a defect in the highway,
but against a private individual; but if
it was against a town, the conclusion
might possibly be different: Baldwin
v. Barney (1879), 12 R. I. 392. Such
an intimation was made in Pennsylvania: Mlohne, v. Cook, suapra. In Massachusetts, this distinction is deemed
unimportant.
In 1859, this question came be(N.Y.) 1o;
s. c. (1882) 89 N.Y.
fore the Supreme Court of the United
219; Osahl v. Judd (1883), 30 Minn.
126; Knowlton v. Mfilwaukee City States: A steamboat, illegally running
on Sunday, came in contact with piling
(1884), 59 Wis. 278; Sewell v. Webster (i88o), 59 N. I. 586; Went- unlawfully left in navigable waters and
was damaged. In a suit against the
worth v.Jfferson (x88o), 6o Id. 158;
railroad company for unlawfully leavBlack v. Lewiston, S. Ct. Idaho, 1887;
ing them there, the question was raised
Sharp v. T". of Evergreen, S. Ct.
Mich. 1887; Association v. Wood, S.
whether the owners of the boat could
recover, since it was unlawful to run it
Ct. Miss. 1887. So, in New Hampupon that day. The Court held that
shire, one going on a social visit, and
that fact was no impediment to a rereceiving an injury from a defect in a
covery, and said: "The law relating
highway, was allowed to recover:
Corey v. Bath, (1857) 35 N. H. 53I. to the observance of Sunday, defines a
duty of a citizen to the State, and to the
This was probably upon the ground
State only. For a breach of this duty,
that it was not to the disturbance of
he is liable to the fine or penalty imothers: see Dutton v. Weare (1845),
posed by the statute, and nothing more.
17 N.H. 34.
In Rhode Island, an inhabitant of
Courts of justice have no power to add
that State brought an action against
to this penalty, the loss of a ship, by
another inhabitant of the same State,
the tortious conduct of another, against
for an injury sustained in Massachuwhom the owner has committed no
setts by the reckless driving of the offense." Philadephia,etc. R. R. Co.
latter. It was decided that the ac- v. Philadephia, et,. Steamboat Co.
(859), 23 How. (64 U. S.) 209. To
tion could be maintained by the
plaintiff, without showing that he was same effect is The Powhalan Steamboat
travelling from necessity. The' Court
Co v. 46ppomattox R. R. Co. (i86o),
also further held that the defendant,
24 Id. (65 U. S.) 247.
having committed an unlawful act,
Injury by carrieron Sunday. There
could not set up in justification of his are two lines of cases, touching the
act that the plaintiff was also violating
liability of common carriers for an inthe statute. From the reported deci- jury resulting from the carelessness to
sion of the case, it seems that the Court
passengers or freight, carried by them
went outside the record. The Massa- on Sunday, at the solicitation of the
chusetts statute was not introduced in passenger or owner. In Massachuevidence, yet the Court pass upon and
setts, the cases deny a recovery by the
comment upon its provisions, citing
injured party: Stanton v. Afetropc'itan
several decisions from that State. The
.R. R. Co. (1867), 14 Allen, 485; Aei-
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falv. Middlesex R. R. Co. (1872), xo9
Mass. 398. These cases are decided
upon the ground that the statute expressly prohibited travelling on Sunday,
unless from necessity or for some charitable design, or to attend divine services; and the traveller, being in the
very act of violating the law at the time
the accident occurred, cannot recover
for that reason. In Feitalv.Middlesex
.R. R. Co. the plaintiff was injured
while travelling on the railroad to attend a spiritualist meeting, and the
question was left to the jury whether
the party was on his way to the meeting for the honest purpose of divine
worship and religious instruction. However, in such a case, no inquiry concerning the character of the services
can be raised, beyond the question
stated. This is a country where religious opinion is free, and entire religious equality is the rule of the law:
See Cooley on Torts, 152. For a very
strong case, where travelling was held
not to be a necessity, see Bucher v.
Fitchburg"R. R. (1881), 131 Mass.
156.
Recovery allowed. But the Massachusetts cases are not in accord with
the great weight of authority. In New
York, one Carroll, on Sunday, paid his
fare and took passage on a ferry-boat
running in connection with a railroad.
While he was on board the boat, the
boiler exploded and injured him. The
immediate cause of the explosion was
too great a pressure of steam; the
boiler was old, and, for that reason,
negligence was attributable to the defendant and its servants for carrying
so high a pressure. But a supplemental finding was made, that the crack in
the boiler (which was the cause of the
explosion), was a latent one, the existence of which was not known to the
defendant, nor could it have been discovered by the exercise of the highest
skill, foresight and care, or by any test

known and practiced by experts in the
business of making, maintaining or
managing steam boilers. It was contended that the plaintiff could not recover, because he was travelling in
direct violation of the law. But the
court refused to sustain this objection to
his recovery, and judgment was entered in his favor. It was also
urged that the contract, if for transportation, was illegal, and the courts would
not enforce it, the defendant being
under no obligation to carry it out; but
this objection was also overruled: Carroll v. Staten Island R. R. Co. (1874)
58 N. Y. 126; S. C. (1873) 65 Barb.
32. In the opinion, the Court assumes
and finds that the explosion resulted
from the negligence of the defendant;
and that the plaintiff's cause of action
had its essential basis in the contract, of
force on the one side, and the undertaking to carry on the other. It also
found that the plaintiff was travelling
in violation of the statute ; but that the
defendant was lawfully running its
ferry-boat, since it is a necessity that
such means of conveyances should ply
on Sunday in densely populated districts. The defendant was not able to
distinguish, nor was it bound to, between those lawfully travelling on that
day and those illegally; and for that
reason it could compel the plaintiff, by
suit, to pay the passage money, if he
had procured the passage on credit.
The contract of carriage was, therefore,
legal; although, possibly, the plaintiff
could not have enforced it in his own
behalf. It was held that the gravamen
of the action was the breach of the duty
imposed by law upon the carrier of
passengers to carry safely, so far as human skill and foresight could go, the
persons it undertook to carry; which
duty existed independently of contract.
Even though no contract existed, and
the undertaking was gratuitous, the obligation was the same. "The law
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raises the duty out of regard for human
life, and for the purposes of securing
the utmost vigilance by carriers, in protecting those who have committed
themselves to their hands :" See
Phiadephia, etc. R. R. Co. v. Derby
(1852), 14 How. (55 U. S.) 483, where
GRIER, J., said: "This duty does not
result alone from the consideration paid
for the service. It is imposed by law
even when the service is gratuitous :"
ood (1821), 3 B.
See Bretherton v.
& B. 54; Allen v. Seoell (1829), 2
Wend. (N. Y.) 327; Bank ofOrangev.
Brown (1829), 3 Id. 158; Steamboat
v.A'ing(1853), 16 How. (57 U.S.)469;
Nolton v. Western R. R. Co., 15 N. Y.
339; Farwell v. Boston R. R. Co.
The
(1842), 4 Met. (Mass.) 49.
liability of the carrier is the same,
whether the action is brought upon
the contract or upon the duly, and
the evidence requisite to sustain the
action in either form, is substantially
the same, and when there is an actual
contract to carry, it is properly said
that the liability, in an action founded
upon the public duty, is co-extensive
with the liability on the contract." For
this reason the action was not within
the principle which forbids a recovery
on a contract made in respect to a matter prohibited by law; or which requires proof of an illegal contract to
support it.
The Court further said: " If, conceding the liability of the defendant,
had the injury occurred on some other
day, a recovery is denied in this action,
it must be on the ground that to allow
it would contravene the general policy
of the statute prohibiting travel on that
day; and that the duty which the law
in general imposes uxn carriers, to
carry safely, does not exist in respect to
wrongdoers who are travelling in violation of the statute. It is certainly a startling proposition, that the thousands and
tens ofthousands ofpersons who travel on

business or for pleasure on Sunday, are
at the mercy of incompetent or careless
engineers and servants, and that there
is no remedy for loss of life or limb resulting from their negligence. Can it
be said that the object of the statute
would be promoted by such a rule ? I
think that this cannot be affirmed, and
at least, that courts cannot say that unlawful travelling would be thereby prevented or even discouraged. Those
who travel in public conveyances on
Sunday do not consider in advance
whether the carrier will be liable if they
are injured through his negligence."
This case was approved in Wood v.
Erie W. R. Co. (x878), 72 N. Y.
196-201 ; and in Platz v. Cohoes
(1882), 89 Id. 219. In the latter case,
the cases of Johnson v. Warburgh,
supfra; Holcomb v. Danly, sufora; Bosworth v. Swansey, sitpra, and Jones v.
Andover, sufira, are expressly disapproved.
In Ohio, travelling is not "sporting" within the meaning of the statute:
Nagle v. Brown (I88i), 37 Ohio St.
7. Other cases allow for a recovery
when the injury is incurred on Sunday,
notwithstanding the violation of the
statute: The Gregory (1868), 2 Benedict (U. S. C. Ct., S. D. N. Y.), 226;
.trickler v. Hough (1855), 1 Pitts.
Rep. (Pa.), 239; Landers v. Staten
Island R. R. Co. (1872), 13 Abb. Pr.
N. S. (N. Y.) 338. As, where the stream
was obstructed: ffohney v. Cook, srepra,
reversing S. C. 3 Pitts. L. J. (Pa.) 14o.
A company provided a canal for the
passage of boats. It was held that all
persons complying with lawful requirements, had a right to navigate it on
Sunday, in case of necessity; and a
"
regulation that no boat will be allowed
to pass the lock on Sunday, without a
written permit from the Superintendent
or his assistant, and this permit will not
be granted unless in case of actual necessity," was unreasonable and void;
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(r) because it required, in cases where
such navigation on Sunday was necessary and lawful, that such permit be
obtained of an officer, who may not be
accessible; (2) because the boat-owner
has the right to determine for himself
the question of necessity for Sunday
navigation, subject only to his liability
under the statute. Although the rowing of the boat was illegal, yet its owner
was allowed to recover the damages he
sustained by reason of the canal company's neglect to repair: AfcArthur v.
Green Bay & Afiss. Canal Co. (1874),
34 Wis. 139. So, power given to a
canal company to revoke by-laws for
the government of the company, for the
good and orderly using of the navigation, and of warehouses, wharves, and
for the well-governing of the bargemen,
does not authorize them to close the
canal on Sundays by a chain suspended
across it, and a by-law for so closing
the canal on Sundays is illegal and
void: Calder 6- Heble Navigation Co.
v.Pilling (x845), 14 M. & W. 75; 9
Jur. 377; 14 L. J. Exch. 223. So,
where a railroad company receives
goods to ship on Sunday, and stores
them on that day, it is bound by the
same degree of diligence as if they had
been received and stored on a week
day. Its duty and obligation are the
same: Powhatan Steamboat Co. v. 4ptomattox R. R. Co., stpra. At an
early day, travelling in Pennsylvania
on Sunday was not forbidden: Jones v.
Hughes (181g), 5 S.& R. 298.
Injury by dog- while travelling.
Where the plaintiff was unlawfully
travelling along the highway on Sunday, and the defendant's dog ran out
and bit him, inflicting a serious injury,
it was held that the plaintiff could recover damages for the injury he had
sustained, and the fact that he was unlawfully travelling could not defeat his
cause of action. His travelling was
regarded as only an incident of the
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injury, and not as a contributory cause,
and the fact that he was unlawfully
travelling on that day could not affect
him: White v. La;ng(188o), 128 Mass.
598. So, a like decision was made in
another State, where a dog frightened
the horses of one travelling on Sunday:
Schmid v. Ilumphrey (1878), 48 Iowa
652.
.njtwy while e forming labor on
Sundr.y. If one is injured on Sunday
by the negligence of another, while the
injured person is unlawfully engaged in
common labor, it has been held that he
could recover the damages he had sustained. Thus, hauling a vessel into its
berth on Sunday is an illegal act in
Massachusetts; yet, in the Federal
courts, it was held that the person sustaining an injury while thus engaged
was not prevented from recovering his
damages from that fact alone: Sawyer
v. Oakman (1370), 7 ]Blatchf. (U. S.
C. Ct., S. D. N. Y.) 290; s. c., i Lowell
134. So, one unlawfully engaged in a
game on Sunday, may recover damages
for any injury he sustains while so
engaged, through the negligence of
another: Etehberry v. Levielle (1858),
2 Hilt. (N.Y.) 40. But in Massachusetts, where one passing, on Sunday, by
a mill where workingmen were engaged
in cleaning out the wheel-pit, and he
offered his assistance voluntarily, which
was accepted; and while so engaged
he was injured, it was held that he
could not recover, because he was engaged in an unlawful undertaking; and
the mere fact that if the wheel-pit was
not cleaned out on a Sunday, the mill
would lie idle on a week day and a
large number of men lose their day's
work, was not deemed sufficient to authorize the work as one of necessity:
McGrath v. lferwin (1873), 112 Mass.
467. [This case was said to be decisive
of Day v. Hlighland Street Ry. Co.
(1883), 135 Id. 113, where a street-car
conductor was injured, while on the
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side step of his open car. This latter
case in turn ruled Read v. B. &I A. R.
R. Co. (1885), i4o Id. 199, where the
engineer of a live stock train was injured on a Sunday.] The opposite
rulingwas made in Johnson v. Alissouri,
etc., R. R. Co. (i886), x8 Neb. 690;
Louirvie, etc., R. R. Co. v. Frawtey
(1886), 1xo Ind. 18; and in the principal case, supra.
Degree of care. To escape liability,
on account of negligence, the person
violating the Sunday law is not held to
any greater degree of diligence than if
he were performing the same act on a
week day. This is the case of a common carrier unlawfully carrying passengers and goods on that day: Tingle v.
C.,B. & Q. R. R. Co. (x882), 60 Iowa
333.
Frightening horses. In Pennsylvania, it was held that the owner of a
horse, frightened by articles carelessly
left in the highway, on Sunday, had the
same remedies, in case of the horse
running away and injuring itself, as if
the injury had occurred while travelling
on a secular day: Piollet v. Summers
(x884), 24 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
235; S.C., 15 W. N. C. (Pa.) 241.
Injuries to hiredhorses. The hiring
of horses on Sundays by liverymen, and
others, has given rise to a number of
cases. The cases cited are all instances
where the horse let has been injured by
immoderate driving, or by torturous
conduct. In one or two instances, the
injury was inflicted by a third" person,
whom it was sought to hold liable. In
an early case, in New York, an action
was brought for an injury inflicted upon
a horse let on Sunday, and it was held
that it could be maintained; that the
action was not on the contract of letting, but for damages for a wrong done:
Harrison v. Marshall(1855), 4 E. D.
Smith (N. Y.) 271. In a subsequent
case, the defendant, on Sunday, hired
a team of horses, and negligently per-

mitted them to run away, whereby the
team and wagon were damaged; and
it was held that an action was maintainable for the damages sustained;
but, in both cases, it was expressly
stated, that no recovery could be had
for the price agreed upon for the use of
the horses. It was held that the improper conduct of the defendants was
not necessarily or legitimately connected
with the contract of hiring; that the
owner did not forfeit or become divested
of his right to the property by the delivery under it; that he had a right to
a return of it, and if it was retained
after a demand, he had a right of action
for its recovery or its value; that there
was no reason or principle why he
should not be compensated for its deterioration or any damage to it by reason
of the fault of the party to whom it was
hired: and that such liability did not
rise from the contract, but from a breach
of duty. in violation of the plaintiff's
rights, wholly irrespective of the contract: Nodine v. Doherty (1866), 46
Barb. 59; S.C., 5 AMERICAN LAW REG:
ISTER 346. Other cases have been decided in the same way, in New York:
Berthoif v. O'Reilly (1876), 8 Hun,
16; S.C. (1878), 74 N. Y. 5o9.
In other States, the same result hat.
been arrived at: that the hiring was
void, but a recovery could be had for
the injury inflicted, and that the commission of one wrong did not authorize
the commission of another, nor release
the other wrong doer from legal responsibility: Steward v. Davis (1876), 31
Ark. 518; WVoodmnanv. Hubbard(1852),
25 N. H. 67; Berrillv. Gibbs (1843),
I Pa. L. J. 313; S.C. (I843), 2 Id. 296.
And in an early Connecticut case, it
was held that the letting of a carriage
for the conveyance of persons on Sunday, from a belief that it was to be used
in a case of necessity or charity, though
no such case in fact existed, was not an
offence: hI'ers v. State (1& 6 ), I Conn.
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driven without the consent o: the owner,
shows a complete cause of action withFrost v. Plumb (1873), 40 Conn.
out any reference to an illegal act. The
III;
S.C., 13 AMERICAN LAWV REGIsillegal letting may or may not appear.
TER 537, is one of the leading cases
If it does, it simply explains the defenupon this subject. The defendant hired
dant's possession, and proves that it was
a horse of the plaintiff to drive from
by the owner's permission, or at leabt
Waterbury to Southington on Sun- for a certain purpose. It may give the
day. He drove, or permitted others
defendant an opportunity to injure the
to drive, the horse some ten miles be- horse, but it does not cause the injury;
yond Southington. The weather was
nor does it not cause the injury; nor
excessively hot, and the extra distance,
does it contribute to it in such a sense
as to make the plaintiff a party to the
coupled with immoderate driving,
caused the horse's death. The plainwrongful act. If it does not appear,
before the defendant can avail himself
tiff brought an action of trover and case
joined, to recover the value of the horse.
of it as a defence, it becomes necessary
The Superior Court held that the action
for him to prove the illegal contract to
could not be maintained, but the Suwhich he was a party, and his own
preme Court held that it could, and
illegal conduct in travelling upon the
reversed the lower court's decision.
Sabbath. But he can no more avail
The Court stated the rule governing
himself of that as a defence than the
such cases as follows: "The plaintiff plaintiff can as a cause of action. Either
cannot recover whenever it is necessary
party, whose success depends upon
Tor him to prove as a toart of his cause proving his own violation of law, must
of action, his own illegal contract, or
fail.
other illegal transaction; but if lie can
In Gregg v. J1'man (1849), 4
show a complete cause of action withCush. (Mass.) 322, it was decided,
out being obliged to prove his own
that if the horse was injured by imillegal act, although such illegal act
moderate driving, there could be no
may incidentally appear, and may be
recovery. So, in Way v. Foster (1861),
important, even as explanatory of other
I Allen (Mass.) 408, which was a
facts in the case, he may recover. It
parallel case to Frost v. Plumb, supra,
is sufficient, if his cause of action is
the same ruling was held. But in Hall
not essentially founded upon some- v. Corcoran (187I), 107 Mass. 251, the
thing which is illegal. If it is, what- ruling of the two former caies was deever may be the form of the action,
parted from. That was a case where a
he cannot recover." Applying the rule
horse was let, to be driven to a particulaid down by it, the Court said, it lar place, and was driven by the hirer
was only necessary for the plaintiff to
to a different place, and, by hard usage,
prove his own title to the property, and
injured. It was held that an action of
a conversion by the defendant. The
tort could be maintained for the condestruction of the horse was a converversion. The Court said: "It theresion. Of this there can be no doubt:
fore appears to us to be clear, upon
see Kennet v. Robinson (1829), 2 J. J. principle and authority, that an action
Marsh. (Ky.) 84; 3, gtoyer v. Haw- of tort for the conversion of the horse,
by driving it beyond the place agreed
thorn (1835), 2 Harr. (Del.) 71; Cobb
v. Wallace (1868), 5 Coldw. (Tenn.)
in the illegal contract of letting and
539. And proof, that the injury which
hiring, is not founded on that contract.
caused his death, occurred while being
And we think it is equally clear, that
502;

Me.

see Morton v. Gloster (1859), 46

520.
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that contract need not be shown by the
plaintiff, and forms no part of his cause
of action." From a subsequent case, it
would ,eern that the courts of this State
had.receded entirely from the ground
assumed in the earlier cases; and that
a recovery would be allowed, where the
horse was injured by immoderate driv
ing in going only to the place for which
it was let on Sunday. Such is the view
taken of the Massachusetts cases in
Frost v. Plumb, stpra, and such, also,
in the rule announced in that case. In
Lyons v. Desotelle (1878), 124 Mass.
387, the plaintiff was allowed to recover
for an injury to his wagon and horse,
sustained at the hands of a wrong doer,
while hitched in a city in violation of a
city ordinance: see torner v. Thwing
(1826), 3 Pick. (Mass.) 192. Such is
the rule in Michigan: Fisherv. A'yle
(1873), 27 Mich. 454; see Judge Redfield's note to Johnson v. Trasburgh or
Vrabut;-h (I875), 14 AMERICAN LAW

REGISTER 553. So, in Maine, if the
hirer goes beyond the place for which
he engaged the horse, and the horse is
injured by his tortious conduct: Aforton
v. Gloster (1859), 46 Me. 520. So, he
is liable, if he employed the horse on
Sunday, and retained it until after sunset (when Sunday ends), and the horse
is then injured by his tortious act:
Bryant v. Biddleford (1855), 39 Me.
193.
No recovery. Notwithstanding the
decisions from Maine already cited, it
has been held that if the injury to the
horse occurs while going to or returning from the place for which it was
engaged, or during the time for which
it was engaged, or for the drive, no recovery can be maintained: Parkerv.
Latner (1872),6o Me. 528; Alorton v.
Gloster, supra. So, in Rhode Island,
where the defendant drove beyond
the place for which he had engaged
the horse, it was held that proof of
the contract, which was illegal, was

necessary to establish the conversion, and that the plaintiff, therefore,
could not recover: Whelden v. Chappel
(1865), 8 R. 1. 23o. And, in a subsequent case, where the horse was driven
on a different journey from that for
which it was employed, and injured,
the same Court held that it was necessary to show the illegal contract in order
to recover, and for that reason no recovery could be had; for, as soon as
that contract was introduced, the action
must fail. Nor was it sufficient for the
plaintiff to merely prove that he did not
let his horse for the particular journey
defendant went; but he must also prove
the contract made with him, and prove
its exact terms. Nor was the plaintiff's
position tenable, that the defendant
could not show the illegal contract to
defeat the cause of action. The Court
distinguishes the case in question from
the cases of Alorton v. Gloster, supra;
jXodine v. Doherty, sup ra, and Frostv.
Plumb, supra, by showing that, in those
cases, it was not essential to the plaintiff's recovery to show the illegal contract, but that the acts of conversion
were distinct from, and capable of complete proof without a suggestion of, the
contract. The Court disapproved of
the reasoning in Ihall v. Corcoran,
supra, and in Woodwan v. Hubbard,
supra. But, in alluding to a stateM.Lmade in the latter case, the Court
said that it was ready to admit, that, if
it was necessary for the plaintiff to bring
an action ofreplevin to obtain possession
of his horse so let on Sunday, after demand made, he could maintain the
action, or even after a sale or destruction
of the horse by the defendant, for the
conversion would be "wholly distinct
from, and independent of, the contract :"
Smith v. Rollins (1877), 1I R. I. 464;
see, however, Baldwin v. Barney
(879), 12 Id. 392. Upon the whole,
it seems, that this case savors so much
of fine distinctions that it is calculated
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ces of this statement, comparing those
cases with the ones already cited. An
author of high standing, after examining
both the English and American cases
upon this and like subjects, says: "The
fact that a party injured was at the
Aggravating damages. Because one
committed a tort on Sunday, while en- time violating the law, does not put
him out of the protection of the law;
gaged in an unlawful work, for that
reason the damages cannot be aggra- -he is never put, by the law, at the mercy
of others. If he is negligently injured
vated: Sibila v. Bahney (1878), 34
in the highway, he may have redress,
Ohio St. 399. So, if a railroad comnotwithstanding at the time he was on
Sunits
trains
on
pany unlawfully runs
day, and by the running, an injury is the wrong side of the way, provided
that fact did not contribute to the ininflicted, the damages for that reason
are not aggravated: Tingle v. C. B. & jury. So, a party who engages in an
unlawful game, may recover for an
Q. R. R. Co., srpra.
injury suffered while playing it, and so.
Comments. The great weight of the
may one who participates in a race and
authorities is against the position asis wilfully run down by his competisumed by the Massachusetts, Maine
tor." Cooley on Torts, 157. A violaand Vermont Courts. In fact. those
tion of the Sunday law is no greater
courts are often inconsistent in their
crime than the commission of any offense
own individual decisions; for, in many
of the same degree, and there is no reacases, a recovery is allowed when at
son why a greater punishment should
the time of the injury the complaining
be visited upon an offender against the
of
in
a
violation
person was engaged
Sunday law than upon one violating
the law: See Baker v. Portland
any other law.
(1870), 58 Me. 199, and AicCarthy v.
W. W. THORNTON.
Portland(1878), 67 Id. 167, as instan
Crawfordsville, Ind.
to favor immoral conduct, rather than
to advance morality. It is such distinctions as these that bring the law into
disrepute; and they are born of the
distinctions of the early common law.
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Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
HUTCHINS' EXECUTOR v. GEORGE, ET Al.
A bequest for the distribution of books, in which the author describes the system
by which the land owners of the country hold the title to their lands, as robbery, is
not such a charity as the courts will enforce.
A bequest of a fund to perpetuate an useful library is valid, even if the library
is composed of a certain class of books, provided they will enlighten and improve
mankind.
Jackson v. Phillis,14 Allen 539, dissented from.

Bill for the construction of a will.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

George A. Vroont, for complainant.
George T. Woodbu/, for Henry George, a defendant.
Schuyler C Woodhull, for Mary Hutchins, a defendant
C V D.Joline, for James Hutchins, a defendant.

William S. Braddcck, the
BIRD, V. C. May 21, 1888.
executor of the last will and testament of George Hutchins,
deceased, by his bill, asks for the construction of the will of
the said deceased. The will first makes provision for the wife
of the testator, and makes other disposition of a small amount
of his property, and then, and lastly, makes the provision forthe construction of which this bill filed -" Lastly. All the rest and residue of my estate of any
and every form, kind and description whatsoever, I hereby
give, devise and bequeath, under the name of 'The Hutchins
Fund,' to Henry George, the well-known author of 'Progress
and Poverty,' his heirs, executors and administrators, in sacred
trust for the express purpose of 'spreading the light' on social
and political liberty and justice in these United States of
America, by means of the gratuitous, wise, efficient and economically conducted distribution all over the land, of said
George's publication on the all important land question and
cognate subjects, including his 'Progress and Poverty,' his
replies to the criticism thereon, his 'Problems of the Times,'
and any other of his books and pamphlets which he may think
it -wise and proper to gratuitously distribute in this country;
provided, first, that the said George, his heirs, executors and
administrators, shall regularly furnish true annual reports of
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the management and disbursements of the said 'Hutchins
Fund' to the paper called 'The Irish World and the American Industrial Liberator,' or its acknowledged successor, and
shall also annually mail, or otherwise send, a copy of said paper,
containing such annual reports, to each of the following persons, to wit: my aforementioned wife, Mary Hutchins, now of
this place; William S. Wood, now of Parker, County of Randolph, State of Indiana; and James Hutchins, now of Selma,
County of Delaware and State of Indiana; and provided,
second, that said George, his heirs, executors and administrators, shall cause to be inserted or printed opposite the title
page of every free copy of his books distributed by means of
this fund, this my solemn request, virtually, to wit: that each
recipient shall read it and then circulate it among such neighbors or other persons, as in his best judgment, will make the
best use of it."
The bill shows that the executor had been warned by the
heirs at law, and next of kin of the said testator, that the said
bequest is void, and that he will not be justified in atttempting
to comply with the provisions of the will respecting it. He
prays, therefore, for the court to declare whether or not such
gift, in trust, of the residue, is legal and valid, and whether it
will be enforced in a court of equity or not; and whether,
under the terms of the will, he is authorized to make sale of
the real estate mentioned therein; and whether the said Mary
Hutchins, the widow, is entitled to dower-in the real estate;
and fourth, whether or not, if the said gift to the said Henry
George be declared invalid, the said testator died intestate as
to the said residue, and in that case, how shall the said residue be distributed; and in case the said residuary clause be
declared invalid, whether or not the said executor is authorized
to sell the real estate, and if so, as to the disposition of the
proceeds thereof; and whether one-third of the proceeds of
the sale shall be considered as personal estate and be distributed as such.
The defendants, Mary Hutchins, the widow, and George
Hutchins, one of the legatees, insist that the said residuary
clause is invalid, and therefore cannot be enforced; first, they
insist that it is not a charitable bequest, within the meaning of
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the term as understood by all text writers and judges who
ever have had occasion to pass thereupon. Much reliance is
placed upon the Statute 43 Elizabeth, chapter 4, by the defendants. They urge that every adjudication, since that time, has
gone upon the theory that nothing will be supported, of the
character named, which is not clearly and indisputably, a
charity.
It is said that this was the view presented by Chief Justice
Marshall, in Baptist Association v. Hart, (I819,) 4 Wheat.
(17 U. S.) 1, in which he says: "We have no trace in any
book, of any attempt in the Court of Chancery, anterior to the
statute, to enforce one of these vague bequests for charitable
uses."
Notwithstanding this eminent authority, the opinion of the
court in Vidalv. Girard,(1824) 2 How. (43 U. S.) 126, 194 ,
seems to establish the fact, that the Court of Chancery had such
power and exercised it before the Act referred to was passed;
and it is insisted that whether or not the said Statute be enforced in New Jersey, the spirit and intent thereof prevails;
Thompson v. Nortis, (1869,) 5 C. E. Green, 522. And to support this, Story's Equity, § I 155, is cited.
What is a charity? Since it often happens that definitions
are framed from and for particular cases, I will not attempt
defining it; but will be content with the views of others, of
great experience and learning, and which are relied upon by
counsel for defendants. Perry on Trusts, § 709, is cited, where
the learned editor says: "Charity has obtained a significance
in law, and courts do not uphold or administer trusts for particular purposes which are not charitable, within the meaning
of the law." Mr. Story adds; "A bequest may, in an enlarged sense, be charitable, and not within the purview of the
statute." Another authority, it is said, writes: "Such charitable bequests only as are within the letter and spirit of the
statute" are sustained; citing Story, §§ 1155, 1158, 1164;
Kendall v. Granger,(1842,) 5 Beav. 300; Williams v. Williams,
(1853,) 8 N. Y. 547; Brown v. Yeale, (I79I,) 7 Ves. Jun. 50,
note; Owens v. Aissionary Society, (1856,) 14 N. Y. 397, 403.
Again, it is said that all of the purposes to which any charitable bequest can be made, may be classified under those
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which are ecclesiastical, educational or eleemosynary: AtlyGen. v. Calvert, (1857,) 23 Beav. 258. And it is claimed that
the gift which we are now considering, cannot be brought
within either of these classifications; for, it is said, that in no
sense does the gift in question have a tendency to benefit or
to improve mankind, being in no sense a school of learning
to educate mankind. The claim further is, that there must be
an indubitable benefit, a tendency to humanize, to elevate and
to improve mankind, before a gift of this nature can be declared
valid or enforced by the courts.
It is said further that in Brown v. Pancoast, (188 I,) 7 Stew.
Eq. 321, Chancellor RUNYON said that a gift by the testator
for the purpose of creating a fund, the income of which should
be devoted to the purchase of books in founding a useful library, was charitable. Counsel says, with respect to this, "Incontestibly, this was a good bequest, and should be enforced;"
but says: "Far different is the purpose under consideration;
here the bequest is to spread light on the land question, by
purchasing and distributing books written by the trustee, on
that question. And it is a bequest for spreading abroad a
man's theories on the question of land tenures and their
abuses and cognate subjects."
A bequest, then, of a fund to perpetuate a useful library is
good. The bequest under consideration, is to spread the light
on the land question; in other words, on the question as to who
shall hold the title to lands, or how that title shall be held, or
for whose benefit. Now, if the gift to establish a library, without classification of the books, or without reference to their
character (except that they be useful), would be good, certainly a gift to establish a library, to be composed of a certain class
of books, or of books upon certain subjects, would be good
also. Would not a gift for the purpose of founding an institu
tion to publish the works of Newton, or of Bacon, or of Milton, or of Shakespeare, or of Edwards, or of Bancroft, or of
Irving, or of McCosh, or Webster, or Marshall, be good? Incontestibly so. If not, then I do not see how we can sustain
the numerous gifts to the Bible Society, within the control of
various denominations of Christians, in this country. But if I
am right in this, then it must follow, that a gift to circulate
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any portion of these works or any one of them, would also be
lawful. And look to high authority.
There can be no doubt that the circulation of one book may
be the object of a testator's bounty. A testatrix provided that
the residue of her estate should be applied towards the printing, publishing and propagation of the sacred writings of the
late Joanna Southcote. The heir filed a bill, alleging that the
gift for such purpose was either void in law, on the ground
that the writings were of a blasphemous and profane character, or that the trust so declared was for the propagation of
doctrines subversive to the Christian religion. It seems that
Joanna Southcote taught in her books, that she was with child
by the Holy Ghost, and that a second Messiah was about to
be born of her body. In speaking of her, Sir JOHN ROMILLY,
Master of the Rolls, said: "In the history of her life, her personal disputations and conversations with the devil, her prophecies and her intercommunings with the spiritual world, I have
found much that, in my opinion, is very foolish, but nothing
which is likely to make persons who read them, either immoral or irreligious." Again, he says: " I cannot say that the
bequest of a testator to publish and propagate works, in support of the Christian religion, is a charitable bequest, and, at
the same time, say that if another testator should select, for
this purpose, some three or four authors, whose works will, in
his opinion, produce that effect, such a bequest thereupon
ceases to be charitable. Neither can I do so if the testator
should select one single author." The bequest was sustained.
Thornton v. Howe, (1862,) 31 Beav. 14If it be so that a bequest for the distribution of the works of
Joanna Southcote, or of the Bible, by an institution founded
for that purpose, is valid, then it is clear that a bequest for any
other single and definite purpose, which will, if carried out,
have a tendency to enlighten or improve mankind with respect
to a given subject or theory, such gift must also be valid, as a
charity, and can be enforced by the courts. It will be noted
that I say to enlighten or to improve mankind. And it is not
necessary that I should more particularly define the object to
be had in view in every such discussion. Certainly if the purpose of the testator was to disseminate doctrines immoral in
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their character, tendency or influence, they could not be called
charitable, in any sense; nor could they, in any sense, be said
to elevate or improve mankind. I cannot but add that it is
not the individual judgment which is to be the guide in every
such case, for manifestly that may be regarded as hostile to the
public welfare, by one individual, which, by another, would be
deemed most useful or beneficial.
This assertion is founded upon what we are taught in all
the pages of history. It is everywhere written that the efforts
of enlightened individuals upon one hand, to break through the
clouds of darkness and of ignorance, or to overcome oppression
and resistance, have, upon the other hand, been as stoutly opposed, if not by persons equally intelligent, yet by persons enjoying
the benefits and advantages which came to them from the existing condition of things, and placed them in positions of supremacy, or of happiness above their fellows. Suffice it to say
that our own national history had its origin in this great truth,
and gives us numerous illustrations of the inestimable value
of it.
Now with these suggestions as to the law, and as to the fundamental principles which should control, let us see what it is
which the testator in the case before us, desires to disseminate.
A few quotations from the books which have been offered in
evidence are essential, and a few will suffice; those which been
presented by counsel for the defense, I will give. Chapter i of
Book 7, in the work on Progress and Poverty, the author heads
with the phrase, "The injustice of private property in land."
Among many of his declarations in that chapter, he says:
"There is, in nature, no such thing as a fee simple in land.
There is, on earth, no power which can rightfully make a grant
of exclusive ownership in land. If all existing men were to
unite to grant away their equal rights, they could not grant
away the right of those who followed them. For what are
we but tenants for a day? * * * Let the parchments be ever
so many, or possession ever so long, natural justice can recognize no right, in one man, to the possession and enjoyment of
land, that is not equally the right of all his fellows. Though
his titles have been acquiesced in by generation after generation, to the landed estates of the Duke of Westminster, the
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poorest child that is born in London, to-day, has as much right
as his eldest son. Though the sovereign people of the State
of New York consent to the landed possessions of the Astors,
the puniest infant that comes wailing into the world in the
squalidest room of the most miserable tenement house, becomes at that moment seised of an equal right with the millionaires, and it is robbed, if the right is denied. * * * The
wide spreading social evils which everywhere oppress men,
and, amid an advancing civilization, spring from a great
primary wrong-the appropriation as the exclusive property of
some men, of the land on which and from which all must live.
* * * As for the deduction of a complete and exclusive individual right to land, from priority of occupation, that is, if possible, the most absurd ground on which land ownership can be
defended. Priority of occupation gives exclusive and perpetual
title to the surface of a globe on which, in the order of nature,
countless generations succeed each other. Had the men of
the last generation any better right to the use of this world,
than we of this? or the men of a hundred years ago ? or of a
thousand years ago ?"
The title of chapter 3, suggests the contents of it, namely:
"Claim of land owners to compensation." "The truth is, and
from this truth there can be no escape, that there is and can be
no just title to exclusive possession of the soil, and that private
property in land is a bold, bare, enormous wrong, like that of
chattel slavery. * * * The examination, through which we
have passed, has proved conclusively that private property in
land cannot be justified on the ground of utility-that, on the
contrary, it is the great cause to which are to be traced the
poverty, misery and degradation, the social disease and political weakness, which are showing themselves so menacingly
amid advancing civilization. Expediency, therefore, joins justice, in demanding that we abolish it. The land of Ireland, the
land of every country, belongs to the people of that country.
* * * The common right to land has everywhere been primarily recognized, and private ownership has nowhere grown
up, save as the result of usurpation. * * * Historically, as
ethically, private property in land is robbery. It nowhere
springs from contract; it nowhere can be traced to perceptions
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of justice or expediency; it has everywhere had its birth in
war and conquest, and in the selfishness, which the cunning
have made, of superstition and law."
In his work on Social Problems, Henry George says: "The
more we examine, the more clearly we see that public misfortunes and corruptions of government do spring from neglect or
contempt of the natural rights of man. * * * The institution
of public debts, like the institution of private property in land,
rests upon the preposterous assumption, that one generation
may bind another generation. If a man were to come to me
and say: 'Here is a promissory note which your great-grandfather gave to my great-grandfather, and which you will oblige
me by paying,' I would laugh at him, and tell him that if he
wanted to collect his note, he had better hunt up the man who
gave it; that I had nothing to do with my great-grandfather's
promises. And if he were to insist upon payment, and to call
my attention to the terms of the bond, in which my greatgrandfather expressly stipulated with his great-grandfather that
I should pay him, I would only laugh the more, and be more
certain that he was a lunatic. To such a demand, any one of
us would reply in effect, 'My great-grandfather was evidently
a knave or ajoker, and your great-grandfather was certainly a
fool, which quality you certainly have inherited, if you expect
me to pay the money because my great-grandfather promised
that I should do so. He might as well have given your greatgrandfather a draft upon Adam, or a check upon the First
National Bank of the Moon.' * * * While, as for the great

national debts of the world, incurred as they have been for purposes of tyranny and war, it is impossible to see in them anything but evil. Of these great national debts, that of the
United States will best bear examination; but it is no exception."
Some observations seem to be necessary, in order to understand the full measure of the subject we are dealing with. The
sentiments or expressions, which I have above recited, are
leveled at the foundation of laws and customs, as they have
existed for many centuries, wherever civilization has had the
slightest foothold; are leveled at principles which in all ages,
where men have been at all enlightened and made progress
VOL. XXXVI.-12
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from barbarism, have been fostered, as among the foremost incentives to human action; and at principles, which have, during all the period named, been regarded as the very bulwarks
of freedom and stability among the nations of the earth. Indeed, in one sentence, it may be said, that nothing, excepting
only the Gospel, has done so much towards lifting man from
the degrading superstition and slavery of heathenism, as the
possibility, by generous effort, of acquiring a certain foothold
upon the soil, which, if he improves, shall be his own and shall
descend as an inheritance to his posterity, or shall be disposed
of according to the owner's will and pleasure. But our author,
by a stroke of the pen, or an act of legislation, would sweep
away every thought, or sentiment, or link, which binds individuals to locality, to home, to society, or to government, and
send him adrift without rudder, or sail, or guidingstar, or beacon light, or a tent to shelter, or a cabin for himself or his little
ones.
Take away this inducement to labor, that is, say to the hungry, "You have no more right to plow and to sow a given
tract of land than any other of the millions who tread the earth;
and if you do plow and sow and cultivate, another has the same
right to reap, or if you do these things and die before you
have gathered, strangers may enter and reap, and your children, for whom you have wrought, may go crying for bread ;"
say to those who go a step beyond, and waste the energies of
a life-time in improving the soil, in erecting comfortable dwellings and barns, that another has equal claim not only to the
soil itself, but to all that has been put upon it for its adornment, and that even the distress of advanced years and the necessities of a growing household, will not protect the possessor, nor insure his posterity in a title thereto; then indeed
will the sweet, reviving, life-giving sunshine of our present
civilization disappear more rapidly than did the Roman, at the
appearance of the Goths and Vandals.
The laws, the customs, the institutions, amid which we have
been brought up, and which have shed that influence which we
regard as hallowed or sacred, upon us, have so influenced us
that we cannot look at this subject in any other light than above
expressed. These laws, customs and institutions may stand
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upon a false foundation, and may shed a false or misleading

light; but to ignore the fact of their influence, or the fact of
their existence, cannot be conceived of for one moment, and
much less are we inclined to reject and overthrow them, when
we consider that they have been sanctioned and maintained by
the judgment, the labor and the skill of the best and wisest of
men, which the past generations have produced.
But the importance of the subject warrants another observation: Suppose the theories of our author should prevail, and
the determination be to resolve society into its original elementary or first principles; what is to be done with the billions
of dollars of improvements, which now beautify and adorn the
earth? Who would be entitled to them? Could another,
who had spent neither a moment of time nor a dollar in their
construction, say to the Astors or the Vanderbilts, that he had
an equal claim to such improvements with them? Could the
tramp say to the day laborer who, by dint of industry, had procured for himself the title to a lot and erected thereon a dwelling for himself and family, that that was as much his dominion and inheritance? And if such difficulties as these were to
be securely removed or overcome, and the wide world lay open
before all men equally, and all the laws on the subject of titles
were abolished, and it were to be considered that each man,
woman and child had an equal right to the whole and to every
part, with all the other millions of inhabitants, what then would
the order of affairs be? Or what then would be the sequence
of the first demonstration ? Indeed, it may be, there would be
no human effort. Perhaps, if there. was no such thing as a
holding, as a title, as a tenure, there would be no labor expended. The whole social system thus transformed, if not
deformed, and the self-imposed edict that no one had any right
to the soil under his feet, except during the momentary occupation, have we not then a picture of what would ensue, in
the mighty hordes that roamed over Asia nearly 2,000 years
ago ?
While these suggestions show us the extent and importance
of the discussion, they do not seem to terminate the discussion. I have said this question is not to be determinedby the
judgment of a single individual, nor of a single court, com-
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posed of many individuals; but it is to be determined by the
true reason or spirit of law, as it has been declared and upheld
for long periods of time. And the law, as I have shown, for
many centuries, has acknowledged and sustained the right of
individuals, to hold title to lands, to dispose of those titles at
their own will and pleasure, and upon their death, if not otherwise disposed of, said lands to descend to their heirs at law.
It is said, however, that while this is a historical fact, it is
nevertheless only the semblance of a right, and has nothing to
commend it, but the veneration which we pay to antiquity. It
is urged that this great fallacy, like many others, is doomed
to vanish before the light of true inquiry. It is also claimed
that, oftentimes, the greater the wrong, the more deep-rooted
and irresistible does it become; and that what has been growing for ages, and winning the admiration of men, because it
fostered their greed and pampered their vices and sustained
their indulgences, will take ages to remove. It is claimed that
these vices and indulgences, and this greed of mankind, have
imposed the fetters which now enslave and degrade the millions of earth. This, of course, is upon the theory that our
habits of thought have been such, that we are at present unable
to distinguish the truth from error. Nor have any of the enlightened men in former ages, been protected by their nearer
approach to the point of departure, from falling under the same
hallucination.
But the process of a proper mental training must be begun.
The alphabet and spelling book of a new departure must be
learned. This, although the work of time, it may be of ages,
the beginning cannot be postponed. Illustrations, we are assured, may be had. The ignorance of the people during the
feudal ages, and the hardships which they endured and submitted to, at the hands of their chiefs, although few in number,
were not removed nor overcome until generation after generation had gone down in the mighty struggle for freedom from
that bondage which was gross in its character, debasing in its
influences, and demoralizing upon the whole body politic.
Century after century were human beings held in worse bondage still, and sold like chattels in the public markets; and to
remove this blight upon civilization, the discussion, although
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feeble in its inception, waxed warmer and warmer, throughout
the ages, until horrid war came to the front and marked an era
of unexampled devastation and blood.
The brief glance, above given, shows us that the revolution
contemplated, involves every moral, social, political and economical problem; and that the only hindrance to its triumph is
said to be the ignorance, prejudice or selfishness of the rulers,
sages and philosophers of the present age. While it is both.
difficult and unpleasant to believe, that our moral capacitiesare
so blunted or blinded as is indicated, that nothing but another
deluge can regenerate mankind, yet in this undertaking we
have no concern in that direction, any farther than to survey
the plan designed and declared to be a mark of safety for the
people, as against all social, political and economical ills. With
this to guide us, I conceive the extent of our duty to be, to
declare whether or not it is within the pale of the law, for the
testator to undertake, by the means indicated, the work of accomplishing such a revolution.
And this brings me to the last and most serious view of this
branch of the subject. Notwithstanding the practical working
out of this problem, by our author and his adherents, involves
our homes, and our firesides, our Church, and our State, and
all the institutions established and regulated thereby, yet there
is one fundamental principle that lies so hard by, and is so interwoven with all the rest, that I cannot forget nor mistrust it,
nor even venture to say that it, too, is not involved in this controversy-I refer to the liberty of speech and the freedom of
the press. But it is asked, how is this principle involved? I
answer, much every way. Think a moment and it will appear
plain. One testator says, by his bequest, circulate the Bible,
another, the tract, and another, establish libraries which circulate everything that is not of an immoral tendency and much
that is, which issues from the press. In many of these last institutions, doubtless, may be found books most questionable
in their character, including many infidel publications of every
type. This fact was admitted on the argument. These, without the slightest discrimination, have been upheld by the
courts, as charitable institutions. It would be impossible upon
principle, to say otherwise, for whenever the courts undertake
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the work of the critic or the censor, and to declare that this or
that is bad, or that this or that is good, when dealing with
questions of this character, unless the book be irreligious or
immoral, then indeed the system of charities which is designed
to elevate mankind by the diffusion of knowledge through
books, must at once begin to decline.
I am not required to say what the Court should do, in case
of a bequest providing for the circulation of an infidel, or blasphemous, or immoral publication. According to the enlightened training of the present age, we cannot believe that such
a case will ever arise, although the generous efforts of many,
the most God-fearing, do, although unintentionally, encourage
the circulation of such books, by their indiscriminate donations,
establishing public libraries. Whether the courts could undertake the winnowing process, is not now material.
But the most that I can say cf the books before me, is, that
they are not indifferent on the subject of Christianity. It seems
to be recognized throughout. I do not find anything in them
of a rebellious or treasonable character, or that is directly calculated to foment public disturbances, or to incite the masses
of the people to revolt; although they contain many assertions
to the effect that every one has an equal right with every other
one to the land; and these assertions, the author endeavors
by various forms of argument to sustain and enforce, and
sometimes by the use of statements couched in very strong
language-yet it cannot be said, so far as I have been able to
ascertain, that any other principle or doctrine is comprehended,
which should induce the court to refuse to aid in enforcing the
trust, except as will hereafter appear.
Now, can the Court. according to its past history and former
adjudications, lay its hand upon this gift, and restrain the
executor from such disposition of it, by declaring the bequest
void or illegal, because it is not a charity? In my judgment,.
this would be contrary to the true spirit and meaning of the
law, because, as I have intimated, I fear it would be aiming a
blow at the liberty of speech and the freedom of discussionThis consideration is at the very threshold. The present
advanced stage of civilization has no other bond so securely
sealed, no other bond cemented by so many precious yet some-
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times conflicting interests, no other bond made so sacred by
innumerable ties, recollections and historic events, as the bond
that vouchsafes to us the liberty of speech and the freedom
of discussion. I am sure that the most of those who enjoy
this civilization, feel too proud of the vantage ground attained
by the instruments of free speech and free discussion, to lay
the foundations for the surrender of them, by depriving any
other one of the use of such means, when they seek to advance
their views, with respect to fundamental principles which they
insist would procure for us a still higher, nobler and purer
civilization.
From these observations, it will appear that, upon the whole
case, I am disposed to sustain the bequest in the will, and
would do so, notwithstanding the clear and strong expressions,
in the very learned and most able opinion, in the case of Jackson
v. Phillips (1867), I4 Allen Mass. 539, in which it is declared,
"that a trust to secure the passage of laws granting women,
whether married or unmarried, the right to vote, to hold office,
to hold, manage and devise property, and all other civil rights,
enjoyed by men, cannot be sustained as a charity," were it not
for the exception to be referred to. The reason given in that
case is, that the bequest aimed directly and exclusively at the
change of the laws, and it was not f6r the Court to determine
whether laws were wise or unwise, but simply to expound them
as they stand. It was observed, "Those laws do not recognize
the purpose of overthrowing them or changing them, in whole
or in part, as a charitable use."
It seems to me that if this principle be followed to all its
logical consequences, all donations for the spread of the Bible,
and to foreign missions to aid in the accomplishment of their
work, would fall under judicial condemnation; for, most clearly,
the work of spreading the Gospel, as carried on by foreign
missions, is successful only in proportion as it overturns and
obliterates existing laws, customs, institutions and religions,
whose origin is so remote as to be beyond discovery. And to
avoid a consequence so disastrous, has induced me to pay no
little attention to the subject matter, and to intimate, as I have,
that the cause of truth, virtue and good government, can never
suffer by the utmost liberality of discussion, even though the

HUTCHINS' TEXECUTOR V. GEORGE, et al.

courts, when called upon to sustain bounties ass charities, do
so, unless such right of discussion should be abused.
The exception to which I have adverted, had reference to
what Mr. George says with respect to the claim of land owners
to compensation. He says: "It is not merely a robbery in
the past, it is a robbery in the present-a robbery that deprives
of their birthright the infants that are coming into the world.
Why should we hesitate about making short work of such a
system? Because I was robbed yesterday, and the day before,
and the day before that, is it any reason that I should suffer
myself to be robbed to-day and to-morrow ? Any reason that
I should conclude that the robber has acquired a vested right
to rob me ?" Again, he says: "Historically, as ethically, private property in land is robbery."
Clearly, the author, in these passages, not only condemns
existing laws, but denounces the fact of the secure title to land
in private individuals as robbery-as a crime. It is this aspect
of the case which leads me to the conclusion, that the court
ought to refuse its aid in enforcing the provisions of this will.
Whatever might be the rights of the individual author, in the
discussion of such questions in the abstract, it certainly would
not become the court to aid in the distribution of literature
which denounces as robbery-as a crime-an immense proportion of the judicial determinations of the higher courts.
This would not be charitable. Society has constituted courts
for the pup~ose of assisting in the administration of the law,
and in the preservation of the rights of the citizens, and of the
public welfare; but I can conceive of nothing more antagonistic to such purpose than for the courts to encourage, by
their decrees, the dissemination of doctrines which may educate the people to the belief, that the great body of the laws
which such courts administer, concerning titles to land, have
no other principle for their basis than robbery.
I have sought to overcome the view just expressed, by striving to bring the books of Mr. George within that branch of the
opinion in Jackson v. Pllips,supra, which maintained that
efforts to produce a change in public opinion, on the subject
of slavery, by the publication of books, newspapers, speeches
and lectures, was charitable, but I have not been able so to do,
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for the reason given. IHowever radical the works of Mr. George
may be; however much in conflict with prevailing convictions
or prejudices; I can find but the one thing in them that in any
sense makes it my duty to say that the court cannot regard
the bequest as charitable.
If I am correct in the foregoing view, the testator died intestate as to all of his estate not disposed of by the three first
paragraphs of his will.
I will advise a decree in accordance wilk Ihcse views.
It will be ob served that the bequest
mentioned in the above case wa-declared not to be charitable, on the ground
that the books to be circulated by the
fund, denounced a large proportion of
the judicial determinations of the higher
courts as crimes; and that no one has
the right to a-sert and teach that our
courts habitually, as a matter of right.
and under the protection of law, rob the
innocent, and that a bequest whkh
would aid in the dissemination of such
views, was void, and not a legal charity,
on account of its object. And yet it
would seem as if the sentiment of the
community were an important factor in
a decision of this kind.
Prior to
861, the courts of the
slave States would not allow charitable bequests, tending to liberate slaves,
stand; while courts of the Northern
States were glad of the chance to help
disseminate anti-slavery doctrines: see
cases of Lusk v. L,-wis (1856),32 Mis-.
297, and Jackson v. Phillips, supra,
hereinafter more fully quoted.
At present, the sentiment of the community is antagonistic to Henry George's
land theories, and the question of public
policy was rightly d:cided by the
learned Vice Chancellor in the case we
are reviewing, and yet lie tried to uphold the bequest, this question of public
policy alone preventing him from so
doing. The theme is hereby suggested,
what charitable bequests will the courts

not enforce on account of the oject of
the charity designated by the testator.
There are no end of cases where chari,ble bequests fail for uncertainty, because they violate statutes, and various
other reasons, but the number falling
within our theme is comparatively small.
What is charity in a legal sense?
In Perry on Trust.,,
709, it is stated
that the wor l claritt, has ob'ained a
,ignitication in law, and that courts do
not uphold or administer trusts fir particular purposes, which are not charitable
within the meaning of the law; nor
trusts e>Cressed in general words, which
do not come within the legal signification
of the word harity,and, further in the
same section, he defines charitable gifts
as, "gits, where they are made to particular purposes which are charitable,
within the letter and spirit of the statute,
or where they are made to charity generally, if there is a trustee with power
to make them definite and certain."
Other writers give practically the same
definitions. There should be an addition to the above, as follows: "provided
that the bequest or gift is not contrary to
public policy."
In the case of Goodllv. (lijon Ars'n
(1878), 29 N. J. Eq. 32, it was decided
that a gift to Trinity Church Sunday
School, in Mount Holly, of Stooo, to be
safely invested, the interest to be applied
to making Christmas presents to the
scholars of s'id school, is not a legal
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charity. Why? I never could understand, but there it is.
Before taking up other cases from our
State reports, let us glance at the decisions in England on this subject. In
Duke's Law of Charitable Uses, it is laid
down (Lond.Ed. 18o5,pp. 125-130) that

a gift to maintain a minister is not good,
for religion is variable, nor for catechising, for the same reason, nor to teach
dancing or fencing, because they are
matters of delicacy. A gift to provide
for the marriage of poor maids is good,
but not to provide the wedding ring, as
that is the husband's duty.
Bacon in his Abridgment, Vol. I., p.
581, defines a superstitious use as when
lands, etc., are secured, etc., "for and
.towards the maintenance of a prie.t or
chaplain to say mass; for the maintenance of a priest, or other man, to pray
for the soul of any dead man," etc., and
the king, as head of Church and State,
must see that nothing is done in maintenance or propagation of a false religion.
There is quite a long line of decisions
in England, declaring such bequests
void: Duke's Char. Uses, p. 466. For
bringing up children in Roman Catholic
faith, void: Cary v. Abbot (I8O2), 7
Ves. Jun. 490. For saying masses and
requiems for souls and for other purposes, void: Heath v. Chapman (1854),
2 Drew. 417; Re Blundell (1861), 30
Beav. 360. The contrary is true in
Ireland: Read v. Hodgens (1844), 7
I. Eq. 17. A bequest of a prize for
an essay, showing "the adequacy and
sufficiency of natural theology, when so
taught as a science, to constitute a true,
perfect and philosophical system," was
held void, as contrary to the Christian
religion: Briggs v. Hartley (850), 19
L. J.(N. S.) Ch. 416.
Bequest to establish an institution for
teaching Jewish religion, held void, as
contrary to the law of the land: Re
Bedford Charity (1818), 2 Swanst.

et a.

5oi. Also, a bequest for the maintenance of an assembly for reading the
Jewish law, and advancing Jewish religion, for the same reason: Da Costa
v. De Pas (1753), I Amb. 228.
Gifts to aid in re-establishing the supremacy of the Pope, are contrary to
public policyand void: De 7heymnnines
v. De Bonn,al (1828), 5 Russ. 288.
This same case decides that a gift to
promote a religious faith contrary to the
statute is void.

A trust for the political restoration Df
the Jews to Jerusalem, is not charitable
in its nature: Habershon v. Pardon
(1851), 4 De G. & Sm. 467.
A trust to buy and distribute such
books as might have a tendendy to promote the interest of virtue and religion
and the happiness of mankind, not sustained as too indefinite: Brown v. Yeall
(1791), 7 Ves. Jun. 50 n. 76.
Gifis to repair tombs, void: Vaughn
v. Thomas (1886), 33 L. R. Ch. D. 187;
Hoare v. Osborne (1866), 1 L. R. Eq.
D. 585 .
In respect to charitable trusts for
printing and circulating works of a religious tendency, courts make no distinction between one sect and another,
unless their tenets include doctrines
adverse to the foundation of all religion
or subversive to all morality, in which
case the bequest will be declared void:
Thornton v. Howe, supra. This is one
of the most interesting cases on the subject to be found.
A gift to be applied for the relief of
domestic distress, assisting indigent but
deserving individuals, or encouraging
undertakings of general utility, was held
to be void, the words "general utility"
comprehending purposes not charitable:
-endallv. Granger(1842), 5 Beav. 300.

Gift to ten poor clergymen, to be
selected by a trustee, is not charitable:
Thomas v. Howell (1872), 18 L. R. Eq.

D. 198; Att'y Gen. v. Baxter (1684), 1
Vern. 248.
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The most important case, and the
last English case I shall mention, is
Thrupp v. Collett (I858), 26 Beav. 125,
in which it was decided that a bequest
for purchasing the discharge of poachers,
"committed to prison for non-payment
of fines, fees or expenses under the
game laws," was void, as encouraging
offences and opposed to public policy.
There have been still fewer cases decided in this country, within the limits
of cur theme, of which the following are
probably the most important.
A bequest to diffuse more generally
the blessings of education, civilization
and Christianity throughout the United
States and elsewhere, was held to be
void, on account of the generality of the
object: Owensv. AlissionarySo. (1856),
14 N. Y. 38o.
A bequest of slaves to trustees, "in
trust for the American Colonization Society," in view of the obvious object and
policy of the society, and its incapacity
to hold slaves for any other purpose than
for emancipation and colonization, was
held to have been made for that purpose and no other, and to be prohibited by the law of Mississippi, and
void: Lusk v. Lewis, sutra. The
above case affirmed the doctrine laid
down in Read v. Manning (1855), 30
Miss. 308, in which it was decided that,
where a testator, by his will, gave his
slaves absolutely to his widow, but by a
codicil thereto gave them to her," if she

should marry and have i.sue, otherwise
they should be set free," the codicil,
although void to the extent of the attenmpted emnaici;pation of the slaves,

revoked the bequest of them made in
the will.
In Jackson v. Phillips, szrpra, it was
decided that a bequest for the purpose
of procuring a change in the laws, was
not a charity. Also, that a bequest to
secure the passage of laws granting
women the right to vote and hold
office, and the rights of men generally,
has nothing of the idea of charity in it.
In this same case, it was further decided that a bequeft to trustees, to prepare and circulate books and newspapers, the delivery of speeches, lectures
and such other means, as, in their judgment, will create a publie sentiment
against slavery in tfils country, was a
legal charity before slavery was abolished.
Taking all these cases, we find that,
where bequests are contrary to public
policy, or where they tend to break
down or change existing laws in that
particular community, they are void.
As I stated before, there are great
numbers of cases where the charities
were not sustained on account of indefiniteness or some other reason, but few
have been held void on account of their
object.
HOWARD C. LEVIS.
Mount Holly, N. J.

